The Step the Government Said No One Would Use
A Qualified Member of the Engine Department (QMED) aboard the Cape Orlando, a U.S.-owned public vessel, slipped on a bare metal lip at the edge of an engine-room step and hurt his back. The United States argued its choice not to put non-skid there was a protected “discretionary function” the court had no power to second-guess — until its own expert admitted a strip of non-skid could be screwed on for a few hundred dollars, and that many ships already have it. After a two-day bench trial, the court found the United States liable under both the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness doctrine and awarded $398,135. This is how the case was won.
A QMED, an engine-room step, and a bare metal edge
The plaintiff was a Qualified Member of the Engine Department (QMED) aboard the Cape Orlando, a public vessel owned by the United States and operated under contract. His job was to stand watch over the ship's machinery in the lower decks. On the day of the injury, he walked to the starboard exit of the purifier room and stepped down toward a step, and he fell, landing hard and injuring his back. The damage proved chronic and ended his career offshore; he has since retrained as a transit operator.
The walking surface in the engine room was green diamond-plate decking — itself an accepted non-skid surface. But the diamond-plate stopped short of the deck's framework edge, leaving a strip of bare metal — the Lip — with no non-skid at all, right at the edge of a step the crew descended constantly. The step just below was diamond-plated all the way to its edge; the decking above it was not.
Because the vessel was owned by the United States, the claims ran under the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act — the statutes by which the government waives sovereign immunity for its vessels — together with the Jones Act and the general maritime law of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. An injured seaman on a public vessel may recover from the United States what he could recover from a private employer in the same circumstances.
Three pillars of an unseaworthy step
The winning theory was narrow and sturdy: an uncoated edge, in a place where crew with oily boots step many times a day, made the vessel not reasonably fit for its intended use — and that easily satisfied the Jones Act's featherweight causation standard. Three findings carried it.
A bare edge in a designated walkway
The diamond-plate decking stopped before its framework edge, leaving the Lip uncoated at the top of a step in a high-traffic route. The court found the entire step — including the Lip — was part of a designated walkway, used by watch crew at least once an hour, and that designated walkways are expected to be non-skid throughout.
Oily boots, by design
Engine-room crew routinely pick up oil and grease on their soles — so routinely that it is common practice to change shoes before entering the living quarters. The court found the worker's boot more likely than not had oil on it. Non-skid where oily boots meet a step edge isn't a luxury; it's the point.
A foreseeable step, not a careless one
Descending a series of steps, it is foreseeable that a sailor lands the ball of a foot on that edge as a natural part of walking. The court found no good reason the step below was coated to its edge while the decking above was left bare — and that the bare edge posed a hazard regardless of its exact width.
The government's own expert handed over the case
The decisive testimony came from the United States's own standard-of-care expert. He insisted the Lip wasn't a designated walkway and that a prudent seaman would never put a foot there — but he offered no real basis for it, and could not explain why the step below was coated to its edge while the decking above was not. The court did not credit that opinion.
What the court did credit were his concessions. He admitted that a small strip of non-skid could simply be screwed onto the Lip, and that many other ships already have non-skid-covered lips in their engine rooms. Those two admissions did double work. On the merits, they showed the fix was easy, cheap, and standard — so leaving the edge bare was a breach. And on jurisdiction, they were fatal to the government's central defense.
The United States had argued that the choice not to coat the Lip was a protected discretionary function — a policy judgment courts can't review, barring the suit entirely. But a simple, essentially no-cost safety fix is not a policy choice. With the government's own witness conceding the repair was trivial and commonplace, there was no policy to weigh. The immunity defense fell, and with it the case turned.
What the United States argued — and how each came out
The government raised four serious defenses. Here is each at its strongest, paired with how the court resolved it.
The discretionary function exception applies only when a choice is susceptible to social, economic, or political policy analysis. Safety judgments rarely are — and a simple, essentially no-cost fix never is. The government's own expert admitted a non-skid strip could be screwed on cheaply and that many ships have it, and there was no evidence the bare Lip was a deliberate, policy-weighed design choice. Jurisdiction retained.
The court agreed diamond plate is adequate — and declined the plaintiff's broader theory that non-skid paint was required throughout. But that wasn't the problem. The Lip had no non-skid of any kind, in a high-traffic walkway where oily boots descend hourly. Leaving that edge bare breached the duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace, and the condition was obvious — so the United States knew or should have known.
The court agreed there was no visible oil on the steps — but that wasn't the theory. Under the Jones Act, causation is satisfied if negligence played any part, even the slightest, and may be proven by entirely circumstantial evidence. The worker's oily boot plus the bare Lip more likely than not caused the fall; where he landed was consistent with a slip on the Lip; and non-skid everywhere else made the bare edge the likely culprit.
A reasonably prudent seaman is more careful than an ordinary person in the engine spaces — but cannot be expected to be perfect in foot placement while descending steps. No contributory fault. And the primary-duty rule failed too: there was no visible oil for him to clean, and no evidence he was expected to keep his boot soles oil-free. Recovery was not reduced.
A simple, essentially no-cost safety fix is not a policy choice — and the government's own expert proved it was no-cost.
Why the immunity defense failedThe judgment
| Element | Awarded |
|---|---|
| Pain and suffering — lost career, lost active life, anxiety, chronic back pain | $200,000 |
| Lost wages (injury through start of new employment) | $145,771 |
| Future medical care (therapy, pain management, psychology, medications) | $52,364 |
| Past medical (paid by the defendant) · maintenance & cure (no double recovery) | $0 |
| Total judgment | $398,135 |
Gross judgment $398,135 · attorney’s fees $99,533.75 · case expenses $82,467.12.
The court was disciplined about damages, and that is part of the lesson. It declined the elements the evidence didn't support — future lost income (the new job paid more than the maritime job), injections and routine imaging the treating record didn't justify, certain diagnoses the MRI didn't back, and lost “household services” the video contradicted. What remained — the chronic pain, the lost maritime career, the wages during the gap, and the medically supported future care — the court awarded in full. A clean liability win, with damages built to withstand scrutiny.
Three lessons that travel past this case
Suing the United States starts at the immunity wall. On a public vessel, the discretionary function exception is the government's first and best defense — and the way through it is to frame the omitted precaution as a cheap, non-policy safety fix. Safety judgments are rarely policy judgments, and a repair the government's own witness calls trivial and common cannot be dressed up as a deliberate weighing of competing interests.
You don't need every theory — you need the right one. The court rejected the oil-on-the-steps theory and declined the broad non-skid-paint opinion. The case still won, because the durable theory — a bare edge in a walkway where oily boots descend — rested on the configuration of the steps and the defendant's own expert's concessions. The strongest proof of an unsafe vessel often comes from the other side's witnesses.
Featherweight causation plus foreseeability beats “no one would step there.” A seaman need not be perfect in his footing, and natural walking motion makes a misstep on an uncoated edge foreseeable. Combine that with a causation burden met by “any part, even the slightest,” and the “prudent seaman would never” argument has nowhere to go.
What this decision teaches injured mariners
Yes, in many cases. The Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act waive the government's sovereign immunity for injuries connected to vessels it owns or operates. An injured seaman on a public vessel can generally recover from the United States what he could recover from a private employer in the same circumstances — including under the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness doctrine.
It bars suits that challenge genuine government policy choices — decisions involving a weighing of social, economic, or political considerations. The way through it is to show the omission wasn't a policy choice at all. Courts have repeatedly held that simple, low-cost safety fixes are not susceptible to policy analysis. When the government's own witnesses concede a repair was cheap and routine, the exception does not apply.
Usually not. A seaman owes a duty of reasonable care measured against a reasonably prudent seaman — but that standard does not demand perfect foot placement, especially while descending steps in the machinery spaces. A foreseeable misstep on an uncoated edge is the vessel's problem, not the sailor's, and may not reduce recovery at all.
Yes. Courts award the elements the evidence supports and decline those it doesn't — future medical care must be medically supported, future lost income requires a real shortfall, and diagnoses need backing. Trimming unsupported items is not a loss; it produces a judgment built to withstand appeal. The core recovery — pain and suffering, wage loss, and supported future care — stands.
Maintenance and cure is a no-fault obligation, but there is no double recovery. Where a Jones Act or unseaworthiness award already compensates the same lost wages and medical expenses, separate maintenance and cure isn't added on top. Here the wage award covered the recovery period and there was no unpaid medical care, so no additional maintenance and cure was owed.
Doyle Dennis Avery LLP
Our firm represented the injured QMED and obtained this judgment after a two-day bench trial against the United States — defeating the government's sovereign-immunity, contributory-negligence, and primary-duty defenses and establishing liability under both the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness doctrine. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome in any future case.
Case summary
A Qualified Member of the Engine Department aboard the U.S.-owned public vessel Cape Orlando slipped on a bare metal lip at the edge of an engine-room step and hurt his back. The United States argued no one would use the step and that its choice not to add non-skid was discretionary; after a bench trial the court awarded $398,135.
Legal lessons from this case
- Claims against the United States for a public-vessel injury proceed under the Suits in Admiralty Act and Public Vessels Act, without a jury.
- A bare step edge without non-skid can be an unseaworthy and negligent condition.
- A 'discretionary function' or 'no one would use it' defense can be overcome with proof the hazard was real and foreseeable.
Injured on a government, military, or commercial vessel?
Claims against the United States and its vessel operators carry special rules — sovereign immunity, the discretionary function exception, and strict deadlines. Talk with a maritime injury trial lawyer who has taken these cases to trial and won.
Request a Confidential Case ReviewAbout this case study. This page describes a public court decision — the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Williams v. United States, No. 3:22-cv-08945-RFL (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2024), entered after a bench trial. Facts, holdings, and figures are drawn from the court's decision. Doyle Dennis Avery LLP represented the plaintiff in this matter.
Not legal advice. This material is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or create an attorney-client relationship. Every case is different, and prior results — including the result described here — do not guarantee or predict a similar outcome in any future matter. Claims involving the United States and other vessel owners are subject to specific statutes, defenses, and filing deadlines. If you have been injured while working on a vessel, consult a qualified maritime attorney about the specific facts of your situation. Doyle Dennis Avery LLP is responsible for the content of this communication.
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